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I. REPLY ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-APPELLANT’S APPEAL 
A. Security’s allegations in their verified Complaint that Crumb is liable for breach of 
contract and that Security is entitled to attorney fees in this commercial dispute are 
sufficient to trigger application of Idaho Code § 12-120(3). 
 
Security acknowledges that Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 259 P.3d 608 (2011) “does 
hold that a party alleging a commercial transaction triggers the application of Idaho Code § 12-
120(3) even if the transaction was not proved.” Reply Brief at 8-9.1  However, Security argue 
that they did not allege a commercial transaction between Security and Crumb in their verified 
Complaint. Reply Brief at 9.  The record provides otherwise.   
Security brought an action for breach of contract against Crumb, alleging in their verified 
Complaint that “Crumb is bound by an express or implied contract with all FRITZ-HEATH 
landowners to provide them access to FRITZ-HEATH through the CRUMB ENTRANCE 
PARCEL”, and that “Crumb’s conduct constitutes breach of contract and/or fraud.” R. 13, § III, 
¶ A (emphasis added).  Security also allege in their verified Complaint that “Plaintiffs have been 
required to retain the services of an attorney in this commercial dispute solely as a result of 
                                                 
1  See Garner, 151 Idaho at 470, 259 P.3d at 616 (“allegations in the complaint that the parties entered into a 
commercial transaction and that the complaining party is entitled to recover based upon that transaction, are 
sufficient to trigger the application of I.C. § 12-120(3).”); see also Intermountain Real Properties, LLC v. Draw, 
LLC, 155 Idaho 313, 320, 311 P.3d 734, 741 (2013) (“In other words, when a plaintiff alleges a commercial contract 
exists and the defendant successfully defends by showing that the commercial contract never existed, the court 
awards the defendant attorney fees.”); Hilt v. Draper, 122 Idaho 612, 622, 836 P.2d 558, 568 (Ct. App. 1992) (where 
an action was brought founded on an alleged contract within the scope of the statute, the statute applied even though 
the plaintiff ultimately failed to prove the existence of the contract, and the prevailing defendant was entitled to 
mandatory attorney’s fees under the statute); Miller v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc., 139 Idaho 825, 
87 P.3d 934 (2004) (action by physician alleging contractual right to staff privileges at hospital came under Idaho 
Code § 12-120(3) even though the court holds no contractual right existed); Noak v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 152 
Idaho 305, 271 P.3d 703 (2012) (award of fees to defendant proper where complaint alleged breach of covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, but no contractual relationship was proved); Intermountain Real Properties, LLC v. 
Draw, LLC, 155 Idaho 313, 311 P.3d 734 (2013) (where complaint alleged commercial transaction defendant 
entitled to award of fees even though no transaction was proved); American West Enterprises, Inc. v. CNH, LLC, 
155 Idaho 746, 316 P.3d 662 (2013) (defendant entitled to award of attorney fees in action where plaintiff alleged 
implied warranty, even though ultimately no privity of contract, thus no warranty, was found). 
2 
Crumb’s incompetency, fraud, or breach of contract, and are entitled to an award of their 
reasonable attorneys fees incurred in this matter.” R. 14, ¶ 15 (emphasis added).  Security further 
allege in their verified Complaint that “Plaintiffs have incurred damages in an amount in excess 
of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO/100 ($10,000.00) to be proved at trial.” R. 14, ¶ 16.   
Security do not dispute that they alleged a breach of contract claim against Crumb in their 
verified Complaint,2 and appear to acknowledge that they alleged a commercial dispute between 
Security and Crumb, but argue that the allegation is not the same as alleging a commercial 
transaction. Reply Brief at 9.  Not surprisingly, the Idaho appellate courts have used the term 
“commercial dispute” synonymously with “commercial transaction” when analyzing Idaho Code 
§ 12-120(3). See Simono v. House, 160 Idaho 788, 793, 379 P.3d 1058, 1063 (2016) (“However, 
because TVNA has prevailed in this commercial dispute, TVNA is entitled to attorney fees on 
appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3).”); Eriksen v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 116 Idaho 
693, 695, 778 P.2d 815, 817 (Ct.App.1989) (“We deem it clear that the Legislature put the term 
‘commercial transaction’ in this statute, not to narrow its scope, but to extend its coverage to 
litigation arising from commercial disputes as well as from certain non-commercial disputes. 
                                                 
2  The district court found that “[t]he agreement that the plaintiffs were attempting to enforce against Crumb 
was a ‘Transfer of Assets and Withdrawal of Members (sic) Interest’ agreement”. R. 340.  Security argued and 
submitted evidence that the Member Withdrawal Agreement contractually obligated A&C LLC to provide access to 
the Fritz Heath through the Crumb Parcel. Aug. 5, ¶ 15.  Security now inconsistently argues that the Member 
Withdrawal Agreement does not apply to A&C LLC. Reply Brief at 5.  If a party alleges the existence of a contract 
other than personal or household purposes, or a commercial transaction, the prevailing party is entitled to an award 
of attorney fees even though no contract, liability or commercial transaction actually existed. Miller v. St. Alphonsus 
Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 139 Idaho 825, 839, 87 P.3d 934, 948 (2004).  The Member Withdrawal Agreement is a 
commercial transaction as defined by Idaho Code § 12-120(3).  The Member Withdrawal Agreement contains an 
attorney fees provision. R. 355. The district court found that Security’s breach of contract and fraud claims were 
frivolous: “Therefore, the Court finds such claims for breach of contract and fraud to have been brought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.” R. 342.  Thus, Crumb is entitled to an award of attorney 
fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3). 
 
3 
This intent is evinced by the Legislature’s use of the conjunctive phrase ‘and in any commercial 
transaction’”); DeWils Interiors, Inc. v. Dines, 106 Idaho 288, 292-93, 94-95 678 P.2d 80, 84-85, 
86-87 (Ct.App.1984).  Thus, as was the case in Garner and Intermountain, Crumb is entitled to 
an award of reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) based on the 
allegations in Security’s verified Complaint that they are entitled to recover attorney fees “in this 
commercial dispute.” Garner, 151 Idaho at 470, 259 P.3d at 616; Intermountain, 155 Idaho at 
320, 311 P.3d at 741.3  As such, the district court’s order denying attorney fees and costs to 
Crumb should be reversed. 
B. Crumb is entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. 
 
Security argue that although there was not an agreement between Crumb and Security, 
there was an oral agreement between Crumb and A&C LLC to grant an easement. Reply Brief at 
10.  Security ignores the law, the facts and the findings of the district court.  The law is not 
debatable.  Before an oral agreement to convey an interest in land will be enforced, the material 
term of price or consideration must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Bear Island 
                                                 
3  Security pursued this lawsuit on the basis of an alleged commercial transaction and contract.  Security 
submitted declaration testimony that “All FRITZ-HEATH landowners are intended beneficiaries of the express 
agreement that the CRUMB ENTRANCE would be used as a permanent access to the FRITZ-HEATH”, and that the 
alleged agreement was made for a commercial purpose, to make money. Aug. 9, ¶ 24.  As discussed above, Security 
argued and submitted evidence that the Member Withdrawal Agreement contractually obligated A&C LLC to 
provide access to the Fritz Heath through the Crumb Parcel. Aug. 5, ¶ 15.  The district court found that “[t]he 
agreement that the plaintiffs were attempting to enforce against Crumb was a ‘Transfer of Assets and Withdrawal of 
Members (sic) Interest’ agreement”. R. 340.  The Member Withdrawal Agreement is a commercial transaction as 
defined by Idaho Code § 12-120(3).  The Member Withdrawal Agreement contains an attorney fees provision. R. 
355.  Security not only alleged damages in their verified Complaint, Security stated in response to discovery, under 
oath, that “Security will seek at least $700,000 in damages against Brian Crumb in the event that a forty (40) foot 
right of way easement is not declared over his property.” R. 150.  As such, the gravamen of the lawsuit pursued by 
Security, “in this commercial dispute” (R. 14, ¶ 15), was an alleged oral agreement to grant an easement, which 
according to Security was to “make some money selling lots” (Aug. 9, ¶ 24) or “in order to save road construction 
costs.” R. 13, § III, ¶ A.  Accordingly, Crumb is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 12-120(3). 
4 
Water Ass’n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 722, 874 P.2d 528, 533 (1994); Hoffman v. S V Co., 
Inc., 102 Idaho 187, 190, 628 P.2d 218, 221 (1981).  The parties dispute that there was an oral 
agreement to grant an easement.  Prior to Crumb’s withdrawal from A&C LLC on September 26, 
2006, Crumb made a verbal offer to the company that upon receipt of $200,000 Crumb would 
grant an easement.  Crumb’s offer was never accepted, and Crumb withdrew from the company 
and executed the Member Withdrawal Agreement on September 26, 2006, wherein the parties 
agreed that there are no prior oral agreements between the parties. 
The district court found that Security did not submit any evidence disputing that Crumb 
was to be paid $200,000. R. 238.  The district court further found that “Crumb never actually 
received any amount of money for the easement from A&C LLC.” Id.  Throughout the litigation, 
Security made various self serving ever changing arguments as to consideration.  However, after 
reviewing all of the evidence, the district court concluded that “[Security] failed to present any 
evidence tending to show that the road construction, or anything else, was ever agreed upon as 
consideration in return for Crumb agreeing to grant an easement.” R. 240.  “Plaintiffs still have 
not pointed to any evidence in the record which proves the consideration or price term of the 
alleged oral contract to grant an easement.” R. 295.  At the conclusion of the case, the district 
court found that Security’s attempt to enforce an easement based on breach of contract and fraud 
“to be wholly without merit”. R. 342.  As such, Security’s attempt to enforce an easement based 
on a declaratory action, which requires the same proof - a written agreement that satisfies the 
statute of frauds; or, on a claim of part performance or estoppel, proof of the material terms of an 
oral contract, is likewise “wholly without merit”.  
5 
It is not debatable that there is no written easement.  “The Court has not received any 
written instrument, signed by Defendant Crumb, which both identifies the land subject to the 
easement and makes clear the parties’ intention to establish a servitude.” R. 299.  It is not 
debatable that Crumb did not sell, transfer, or promise Security anything whatsoever. R. 106, ¶ 
25, 107, ¶ 29.  Security could have and should have searched the records of the Kootenai County 
Recorder, wherein they would have determined no easement existed over and across Crumb’s 
property to Security’s lots. R. 107, ¶ 29.  Security failed to simply ask Crumb if there was an 
easement over and across his property to Security’s lots.4 Finally, it is not debatable that the 
merger clause contained in the Member Withdrawal Agreement precludes the alleged prior oral 
agreement to grant an easement.  The district court found that Member Withdrawal Agreement’s 
“merger clause serves as further evidence that there was no additional agreement between 
Defendant Crumb and A&C LLC to grant an easement.” R. 239.5  As such, Security’s 
declaratory judgment action for an easement, which required proof of a written easement, or 
proof of an oral contract, the same proof as Security’s breach of contract claim which was found 
by the district court to have been brought frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation, 
                                                 
4  Security argue that Crumb must rescind an agreement to grant an easement and sue for money damages. 
Reply Brief at 10.  However, there is no agreement to rescind as Crumb did not enter into an agreement to grant an 
easement. R. 240, 295 and 342. Security also argues that Crumb must offer an explanation as to why a road was 
constructed over the Crumb Property. Reply Brief at 10.  Security does in fact have legal access to their lots. R. 116.  
Security desires Crumb to grant Security with more convenient access over the Crumb Property, without any 
consideration to Crumb.  Regardless, Security, not Crumb, has the burden to prove an agreement to grant an 
easement, including an agreement as to price and consideration, by clear and convincing evidence. Bear Island, 125 
Idaho at 722, 874 P.2d at 533. 
5  Security argued and submitted evidence that the Member Withdrawal Agreement contractually obligated 
A&C LLC to provide access to the Fritz Heath through the Crumb Parcel. Aug. 5, ¶ 15.  The district court found that 
“[t]he agreement that the plaintiffs were attempting to enforce against Crumb was a ‘Transfer of Assets and 
Withdrawal of Members (sic) Interest’ agreement”. R. 340.  Security now inconsistently argues that the Member 
Withdrawal Agreement does not apply to A&C LLC. Reply Brief at 5. 
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should have been likewise so found. R. 342; Idaho Code § 12-121.  As such, the district court’s 
order denying attorney fees and costs to Crumb should be reversed. 
C. Crumb is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
For the reasons set forth in Crumb’s opening brief and above, Crumb is entitled to 
attorney fees and costs before the district court and on appeal. 
II. CONCLUSION 
 
 Based on the foregoing, Crumb respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district 
court’s Judgment dismissing Security’s Complaint with prejudice, reverse the district court’s 
decision denying Crumb’s attorney fees and costs, and award Crumb attorney fees and costs 
before the district court and on appeal. 
DATED this 14th day of December, 2018. 
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